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This Government assumes that the questions facing the German people,
which derive from the Second World War and from the National
betrayal [that occurred] through the Hitler regime, can ultimately
be resolved only in the context of a European peace order. No one
can talk us out of [ our belief], however, that the Germans have a
right to self-determination, as do all other peoples.
--Willy Brandt
Regierungserklarung,
28. October 1969
The year 1985 may well go down in the postwar annals of German-German
relations as a period of unanticipated and -- more importantly -- largely
unnecessary political turbulence.

Three developments in particular, namely, a

protracted debate over whether/when/where/how to commemorate the fortieth
anniversary of the war I s end, a resurgence of inflammatory rhetoric regarding
the (im)permanence of the Oder-Neisse borders, as well as the media hype and
bitter reaction surrounding Ronald Reagan's controversial Bitburg visit, have
occupied the center stage at the expense of othe\ reconciliation issues.

All

three have taken their toll on the short-term prospects for a dramatic
improvement in the relations between the two Germanies.
The resulting turbulence was unanticipated insofar as the two preceding
years had witnessed an intensification of efforts on the part of Helmut Kohl
and Erich Honecker to

11

1 imi t

the damage"

inflicted by the deployment of

additional theater nuclear weapons on German soil as of 1983.
may

be

judged

unnecessary

to

the

extent

that

the

The turbulence

cooling

of

these

damage-limitation efforts was neither a function of a general escalation in
East-West tensions,
situation.

nor the unavoidable byproduct of a specific crisis

Rather, it appears that a chilling of German-German relations was

an artifact engendered by ultra-conservative forces found within Kohl I s own
party, whose provocative rhetoric can best be interpreted as one la st-ditch
effort to turn back the clock of Ostpolitik.
Four decades have passed si nee the would-be Thousand Year Rei ch became

2

two Germani es condemned to a state of

11

permanent provi sional'i sm. 11

Instead of

closing the book on one particularly ignominious chapter of German history,
the events marking the observation of the fortieth anniversary of May 8, 1945
have in many respects only served as a reminder that the world has yet to
devise a

11

final solution 11 to the once-and-future German Question.

Still, the

global community remains most reluctant to leave the determination and the
implementation of such a final solution up to the Germans themselves, even if
that solution has at its core a vision of two separate-but-neutral states.
The forces of German nationalism have many times ayer given birth to a
state of \~ar in Central Europe.

It is only recently that a new creed seems to

have taken root in a now-divided Germany, one which holds
never again be launched from Getman soil , 11 and that
fought on German soil • 11 1

11

11

that war shall

war shall never again be

If German nationalism can be historically construed

as a catalyst to war, then it seems logical that its antithesis, namely,
German neutralism, might someday serve as the best guarantor to peace in the
region.

It is therefore ironic that the calls for a neutral, nuclear-fr(ee

Germany advanced by peace movement activists in both the Federal Repub 1 i c
(FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have met with such a hostile
response from · the superpowers.

The 1atter assume that the fortunes and (the

future of· East~west relations depend on a balance of forces that only clearly
discernible alliance structures can provide; hence, the Soviet Union and the
United States are inclined to view any moves towards European neutralism, as
inherently destabilizing -- especially if they are coupled with German-German
-

rapprochement.
This paper focuses on a limited number of critical linkages between
nationalism, neutralism and the future course of German-German relations.
author

begins

with

the

premise

that

a

unique

gee-strategic

The

location,

3

demographic polarization and a shared "missing" national identity accords to
the East and West German peace movements a political

significance not

witnessed in other European systems since the pacifist movements began to
develop momentum in 1979.

She therefore sets out to explore the immediate and

longer-term perspective of separate but related German peace movements and to
study how the post-1983 deployment of additional theater nuclear forces in
Europe have affected the conduct of German-German affairs over the 1 ast few
years.
The essay begins with a brief overview of significant peace movement
developments occurring in the two German states from 1979 to the present.

It

then outlines recent pacifist proposals for a New European Peace Order that
sees in neutro-nationalism (alternatively, national-neutralism) a hopeful and
positive response to the historical conundrum known as the German Question.
The third section of the paper surveys the character and the scope of measures
undertaken by political leaders to intensify and normalize .contacts between
the two states after 1979, measures which for a short time at least seemed to
take precedence over other pressing items on their respective foreign policy
agendas.

In the fourth and final portion of the paper, the author bemoans the

lack of an adequate conceptual framework for use in determining the next steps
that might be undertaken to
Gerrnanies.

improve further

relations between the two

She argues that one construct, born of a desire to "limit the

damage" once peace movements proved unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent
deployments, heralds the possibility of a new type of Entspannungspolitik.
Known in German as the Verantwortungsgemeinschaft, the idea of a "Community of
Responsibility" between the two Germanies eschews a traditional attachment to
the concept of nati anal soverefgrftY.> but does not deny the importance of
system-affect, as an inducement to the creation of a truly European peace.

4

I.

Peace Movement Dynamics in the Divided Nation
Individually and collectively, the Federal Republic of Germany and the

German Democratic Republic are faced with a unique security paradox.

On the

one hand, both are expected to engage in frequent and public disavowals of
each other 1 s domestic and foreign policy achievements in order to demonstrate
their

fidelity

superpowers.

to

the

ideological

system

imposed

by

their

respective

On the other hand, the very division of Germany that holds the

two states hostage to insecurity unter sich has become one of the stablest
elements

in

the

Western blocs. 2

ongoing,

unstable confrontation

between

the Eastern and

Both history and geography make it impossible for either

German state to divorce questions of national security -- and the issue of its
postwar

half-national

identity

from

the

dialectic

of

international

relations. The motive f9rces behind the West and East German peace movements, as
they

have

evolved

unidimensional.
feminist,

over

the

last

five

years,

have

been

anything

but

1heir ranks include a kaleidoscope of religious, ecological,

Third-World-solidarity

challenging specific national

and

11

alternative

culture 11

groups.

In

and collective security policies adopted by

th~ir political leaders, as well as the manner in which defense doctrines have
been (externally),determined and imposed, mobilized publics in both the FRG
and the GDR have•opened a political Pandora 1 s box containing more than one
German Question.

Why is the national identity issue, for example, suddenly

generating so much academic interest and media attention, and why is the
reaction against this resurgence so strong?3
it need to be defined now?
11

Who or \'Jhat is German, why does

How is it related to significant displays of

extraparliamentary opposition 11 and religious activism associated with the

anti-nuclear and pacifist movements?

What accounts for the breakdown in

5

consensus among leading West German politicians as to whether their German
Questi.on is open or closed?

Is East Germany as immune to a nationalist

renaissance as it would like to believe?
11

And should.either side worry about

anti-Germanism 11 abroad?4
\

Pierre Hassner gives voice to one speculation that establishes a sense of
kin

among

nationalism.

the

di spa rate

spirits

escaping

from

the

Pandora's

box

of

Not implausibly, he posits that,

if both German states have to deal today with a protest movement
that brings into play the antithesis between East and West, as well
as the division of Germany ••• then they might also have an interest
in quelling these movements either together or separately, in order
to preserve their respective [new] identities.

If, on the contrary,

under the influence of these movements or on their own, they evi nee
a tendency to get closer or to provide mutual support, then they may
find a common interest in so shaping their relations as to achieve
an optimal balance between cooperation and dem~rcation, in order to
reconcile simultaneously the preservation of one German identity
with their own specific identities; [they would do this] in order to
balance

out the

obligations

to - their

alliances

and

respective

superpowers by means of a certain type of autonomy to be gained by
playing out inter-German relations in the right way.5
Were the two Germanies to succeed in their efforts to a) define the
parameters of that

11

optimal balance, 11 b) draw a fine line between a shared

albeit general historical identity and their separate, system-bound postwar
identities, and c) design

a

set of procedures that would allow them to pursue

the first two objectives without detonating the traditional landmines of fear
in the field of East-West rel ati ans, they would undoubtedly come to enjoy a

6

more

positive

international

image.

The

qualitatively

different

type

of

political leverage such a development might afford the two Germani es at the
global level raise a second and equally intriguing question with respect to
the "new social movements."

At issue is

Whether it is really pacifism and environmental consciousness that
gives impetus to a national-community feeling,.'or whether it is not
the reverse, that by invoking ••• the special responsibility of the
two

German

states,

it

is

the

"national

feeling"

that

is

attempting ••• to express itself and to legitimize itself at home and
abroad.6
I have argued at greater length elsewhere that the first alternative
appears to be the most plausible; that is, nuclear anxieties and ecological
concerns, coupled with a rather abrupt changing of the generational guard,
have fostered a sense of neutro-nationalist interdependence and have awakened
interest in a special
Central Europe.7

11

German 11 responsibility for preserving the peace in

Rather than recount the detailed and varied histories of

contemporary peace movements in the FRG and the GDR, I will only highlight
briefly a number of important developments which over the last- five years,
appear to have influenced the pol i ti ca 1 opportunity structures in both states; 8

. -- -:in

this respec;t it can be argued that the peace movements have (at least

indirectly) brought about a change in the political· climate that is more
conducive to German-German rapprochement.
Rooted in a thirty-year tradition of peace protest, the West German
Fri edensbewegung represents- a unique fusion of anti-rearmament, pro-ecology,
extra-parliamentary opposition and alternative-party forces that by 1983 had
succeeded in mobilizing the largest protest coalition ever witnessed in the
Federal

Republic .9

The lifeblood of what has loosely been labeled "the

7

movement" is a commitment to citizen participation in consciousness-raising
and

protest activities

at the

local

and

regional

levels.

A reticulate

structure consisting of thousands of parish and "citizen initiative" groups
for peace and against nuclear technology of any kind ensures a measure of
heterogeneity

ideological
mobilizational

and

strategies.

di verse

perspectives

on

appropriate

Naturally, decentralization and diversity have

their costs as well as benefits in a campaign designed to reverse national
security decisions taken at the highest levels of government.
The catalyst to a mass mobilization campaign for peace in the Federal
Republic was the now-infamous NATO. Double Decision of 12. December 1979.
Issued in the fonn of a communique among NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers,
this

1979

resolution

(instigated

by

none

other

than

a

1950's

rearmament-opponent by the name of Helmut Schmidt) foresaw the deployment of
572 Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles as a response to the Soviet.
SS 20 deployments of the late seventies.
The first surge of peace protest in the FRG flowed rather unexpectedly
out of the 19th annual synod of the German Evangelical Church, which attracted
some 150,000 uninvited young participant-observers to Hamburg in June, 1981.
Coinciding

with

a

sharp

increase· in

prol i fer a ti on of squatters'

movements,

youth

unemployment

figures

and

a

this phase was characterized by a

growing, if still amorphous, sense of existential Angst,, particularly among
the young.

It peaked with a nonviolent demonstration attracting over 300,000

to Bonn on 10. October 1981.
late October regarding the

11

Statements attributed to President Reagan in
'

conceivability 11 of a winnable, limited nuclear war

unleashed a second wave of protest, drawing in many "survivors" of past
protest movements.

During this phase, expressions of nuclear Angst acquired a

concrete foundation as Central European residents began to comprehend what

8

"flexible response" held in store for them.

A wide. range of ecological and

professional groups opposed in principle to nuclear weapons and NATO's general
strategy of deterrence swelled the protest ranks substantially; their efforts
culminated in the anti-Reagan -demonstrations of June, 1982, held in Bonn and
Berlin.
The peace movement entered a third phase with Kohl's March, 1983 election
to

the

Chancellorship which essentially cleared

Bundestag vote on the initial deployments.

the way

for

a positive

This phase "".- saying

specific NATO directive -- climaxed with a nationwide

11

11

No 11 to a

Action Week, 11 followed

by a "Besieging of the Bundestag," during the months of October and November,
1983; activities during the final weeks of the "Hot Autumn
estimated two to four million direct participants.

1

83 11 rallied an

Efforts to follow up with

further Hot Autumn activities in• 1984 were less successful; the

11

minimal

consensus 11 between and among the panoply of groups began to disintegrate once
the initial deployments were complete.

The ex officio national Coordinating

Committee disbanded in November, 1984, but

11

the movement" is by no means over.

Rather, it has shifted its focus back to the local levels, town councils and
parish organizations, in the hopes of cultivating a new, positive, grassroots
consensus on political alternatives to current defense doctrines.
What the East German peace movement lacks in terms of breadth and body
counts, it makes up in patience, determination and personal courage.

As in

the Federal Republic, the Eastern movement has .come to encompass a broader
array of societal problems and discontents, especially among an increasingly
restive youth

population.10

interested in political

Just as

importantly,

process as well

the

peace movement is

as in policy outcomes.

Activists

intent on making maximum use of very limited channels for participation and
expression of dissent have discovered a rare opportunity, one that serves to

9

promote political learning among citizens as well as among party leaders.
a system which has yet to recognize the concept of a
turnouts

ranging

from

2,000-7 ,000

signify

an

11

loyal

important

In

opposition,

testing

of

11

the

political waters.
As a general
effort

not

to

rule, peace activists in the GDR have made a conscious

create

a

highly

mobilized,

mass-based

organization,

the

appearance of which would only provoke a major crackdown by the authorities
against

alleged

enemies

of

the

state.

Despite

the

low-keyed,

highly

decentralized nature of their protests, pacifists to the East have succeeded
in sensitizing the party leadership to the fact that

11

the movement' s 11 progress

and how the SEO chooses to respond to it can hold 1ong term consequences for
the system.
11

With no leading dissidents to expel, the SEO risks_ losing the

hearts and minds" of the many second and third generation GDR-citizens who

have begun to grant the system -- and in particular, statesman and Premier
Eric~ Honecker -- a measure of legitimacy and grudging respect.
An iron-fisted approach banning further public appeals for peace at home
would moreover be inconsistent with the party's practice of using Neues
Deutschland to report enthusiastically on anti-NATO protests in the West since
1979.

The anti-Pershing II and cruise missile theme finds some expression in

the East, but cognizant of their Warsaw Pact membership, few East Germans
would

expect

to

influence

or

hinder

these

deployments.

They

perceive

themselves to be similarly constrained with respect to developing an anti-SS
20 1 s theme, as vulnerable as the GDR has become through the counter deployment
of nuclear weapons on its own soil for the first time as of December, 1983.
The real issue for peace activists in the East is a "home-grown" one, namely
the focus on and protest against the increasing militarization of socialist
society itself.

10

Much of the early momentum for the East German peace campaign derived
from parental opposition to paramilitary instruction modules made part of the
polytechnical school curricula in the early 1960 s.
1

Protestations intensified

with the introduction of obligatory military or paramedic training sessions
for Abitur classes in the early 1970 1 s.

Like its counterpart in the FRG, the

East German Lutheran Church more or less unintentionally became a conduit for
opposition to the arms race; it began with efforts by individual clergy
members to counsel would-be conscientious objectors and draft resisters in a
universal

conscription system that has refused thus far to consider a

non-military

alternative- service

option.

The

mid-seventies

added

many

intellectuals to the ranks of potential movement sympathizers, with the state
taking some- pains to isolate those said to

have contracted the

fever 11 from increasingly rowdy youth groups.

The latter began to c_lash with

police over the ban on

rock concerts

and to

protest the

11

Helsinki

intensified

reglementation of 11 free time. 11
The developmental phases (from Angst, to general opposition, to focused
protest) have been less pronounced within the East German movement, but there
are nonetheless a few·important parallels to be drawn relative to mobilization.
efforts in the West.

The Dresden Forum sponsored by the Evangelical Church in

February, 1982 served as the East German equivalent to the Hamburg synod of
1981, attracting roughly 5,000 young participants; commemorating the Dresden
bombings, the general theme was one of nuclear Angst.

Six months later the

Church

position on

publicly distanced

deployments.

itself

from

the

party's

nuclear

In an attempt to squelch an autonomous peace movement, the SEO

started to stage its own rallies and appeals, using the communist youth group
(FDJ) as its vanguard.

The leadership meanwhile began to intimate that NATO

deployments might hold dire consequences for German-German relations, inducing

11

feelings of a more concrete threat among Eastern activists.

By the time

counter-deployments to the Pershing II's were initiated, individual dissenters
saw fit to protest this Warsaw Pact move more directly, in letters to Neues
Deutschland, for example.
The "national question" began working its way into the peace discussio~
on both sides in late 1981.

The catalyst, appropriately enough, was an

officially sponsored meeting of 100 East and West German writers, artists and
scholars in Berlin-East.
since

been

transferred

The dialogue initiated at the Hotel Stadt Berlin has
to

larger,

even

cross-national

forums.

Its

participants are making an effort to understand where the German Question
stands in relation to the creation and maintenance of a "New European Peace
0rder. 11
the

In other words, the question is raised whether Deutschlandpolitik is

functional

equivalent of

Friedenspolitik

( 11 peace

policy 11 ) .

Does

an

improvement in relations between the FRG and the GDR constitute a necessary
and sufficient condition for the preservation of peace in Europe?

The link

between Deutschlandpolitik, under the new label of neutro-nationalism, and
broader plans for a European peace order is outlined in the section below.
II.

Divided but Disengaged:

German Neutro-Nationalism

The connection between the problem of a divided Germany and the prospects
for peaceful coexistence in Europe was emphasized by Willy Brandt as early as
1969.

Mindful of the tenuous nature of the balance between the two, the first

Social Democratic Chancellor noted:
Twenty years after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic, we must prevent a growing-apart
of the German nation and must also attempt, by way of reg~lating our
:e~

t·

[existence] next to each other, to come to a [condition of living]
with one another.

This is not only a German interest, because it

12

has its significance for the peace in Europe and for the state of
East-West relations as well .11
Brandt aspired to rapprochement between the
reunification at any cost.

11

two-states-in-one-nation, 11 not to

The desire to integrate Germany into a democratic,

peace-loving Europe superseded the wish for a return to the sovereign and
independent nation-state.
Largely the work of leftist intellectuals, the 1980's resurrection of the
11

two states/one nation 11 debate has already given rise to a number of specific

proposals designed to secure the European peace.

The following . outline of

three fairly representative samples is merely intended to whet the reader's
appetite, rather than to satiate his/her hunger for a comprehensive analysis
of each.

The proposers themselves are primarily interested in providing a

framework for discussion; specific tactics have yet to be devised.
In

a characteristically

impulsive

fashion,

members of West-Berlin's

Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection or AL [a radical
party variant of the Greens] began devoting energy and platform space to the
Deutschlandfrage prior to the 1981 city-state elections.

Spearheading the

drive for a four-point disengagement program for Berlin, in particular, i's a
true child of Ostpolitik, Peter Brandt, the son of the Nobel Prize winning
Chancellor himself.

While this proposal

does not preclude the ·1ong-term

possibility of reunification, it is more attuned to enhancing the prospects
for German-German self-determination at present.12
In

essence,

members

of

the

Al's

Work

Group

on

Berlin-

and

Deutschlandpolitik have decided to issue a four-dimensional challenge to the
status quo of German division.

Along the military dimension, the AL advocates

the creation of a German nuclear-free zone, the withdrawal

of all but a

symbolic contingent of occupation forces from both sectors of Berlin,· and the

13

termination
respectively.

of

FRG
On

and
the

GDR

membership

political

in

front,

NATO

the

and

proposal

the. Warsaw

Pact,

foresees

loose

a

confederation that would permit greater cooperation in the areas of economics,
environmental protection, transportation, urban development, culture, science,
sports

and Third

World

assistance.

recommends an extension of the

11

With

special

respect

to

economics,

the

AL

ties 11 concept established .in the

Quadripartite Agreement of 1971; this would enable the GDR to participate in
GATT arrangements, provide a basis for the convertabil ity of the East German
mark and foster West Berlin's integration

into the East German economy.

Regarding the 1egal dimension, the Alternatives are prepared to push for a
formal peace treaty along the lines of the

i

11

Austrian model , 11 while eliminating

priori prohibitions on reunification talks.

be determined by the Germans themselves.

The mode of reunification would

The AL has assumed a more aggressive

stance to avoid a repetition of the Left 1 s historical mistake of leaving the
11

German Question 11 open to the demagogic manipulations of the Right.13
11

Nationalism from the left 11 has a neutralist core, revolving around the

concept of Paktfreiheit.

The interest in a disengagement of the two Germanies

from their respective blocs has not only been voiced by alternative-party
members, left-wing Social Democrats and at l~ast one elected official (Oskar
Lafontaine, new Minister-President in the Saarland) in the West.14

It is an

interest also shared by radical-democratic intellectuals in the East.

In an

open 1etter to Brezhnev in September, 1981, GDR-di ssi dent Robert Havemann
wrote of the pressing

need to conclude a peace treaty and withdraw all

occupation troops from both parts of Germany .15

Signed by 200+ supporters,

this appeal was reiterated and the catalogue of demands expanded in a public.
letter to Erich Honecker composed by East Berlin Pastor Rainer Eppelmann less
than a week later.

Eppelmann outlined sixteen measures for mitigating the

14

threat of a European nuclear holocaust; included were a ban on the production
and sale of war-toys for children, the elimination of paramilitary modules in
the schools, and the creation of a non-military alternative service.

Three

additipnal measures called upon Honecker personally to advocate publicly, the
creation of a Central European nuclear-free zone, to support the withdrawal of
all foreign troops from all European states, and to work openly towards a
step-by-step total disarmament.16
Proposals developed in the FRG and the GDR are mirrored in the plan for a
New

European

Peace

Order,

the

parameters

of

which

have

been

set

by

participants at a series of annual European Nuclear Disarmament conferences
(most recently

in Perugia,

during

the

summer of 1984).

The

collective

consensus among European peace movement activists rests on a 5-step plan for
reducing

the

prospects

of

a

nuclear

holocaust

at

their

expense.

The

centerpiece is a non- al i gned, if divided Germany; but the pl an would al so
bring about a fundamental restructuring of security relations throughout the
region.

The first step is a Stop! or an immediate freeze on the testing,

production and deployment of any further nuclear weapons on European soil •
Step two involves the creation of a nuclear free zone, initially extending 300
kilometers

on

either

side

of

the

German-German

stretching "from Poland to Portugal • 11

border,

and

eventually

The third step ordains the creation of

"tank-free" zones, on the assumption that a replacement of nuclear devices by
ever

more

horrendous

bacteriological
residents.

Step

ones)
four

simultaneous withdrawal

11

conventional 11

would
would

pose
have

an

_weapons
equally

the

two

(including

chemical

grave

threat

to

German

states

undertake

and

European
a

'7,

from their respective blocs, to be followed by the

formation of a regional security system.

The fifth step, not necessarily last

in terms of timing, entails the establishment of a European Security Council a

15

la

Helsinki.

An

institutionalization

guarantee that the superpowers will

of

security

talks

is

intended

to

be seeking a reduction in arms on a

permanent basis (in view of the hiatus in INF negotiations experienced between
October, 1983 and March, 1985).

It is also to. ensure the direct and active

involvement of the European states in those negotiations upon which their own
survival depends.
At a minimum, one can argue that the German Question has been modified
and

transformed

proposals.

by

peace

movement

developments,

as

reflected

in

these

It is difficult to delineate where German nationalism ends and

neutralism begins, or where neutralism ends and nationalism begins, even for
analytical purposes.

The new (neutro)nationalism is not rooted in a drive for

reunification defined in terms of a single German nation-state.

Rather, it

bespeaks a search for a national identity to be shared by two Germanies and to
be developed with an eye to their mutual survival needs.

The threat of an

impending nuclear holocaust may be' bringing many of these sentiments to the
surface, but one can al so argue that they have been longer in the making.
Indeed, they may have been born of a period of relative stability in East-West
relations, as Richard Lowenthal has ascertained:
What has created the striking sense of a common political interest
between the two German states of very different political structures
and ideologies has been, first, the revival of a sense ·of common
nation hood during the period of detente, and second, the rising
sense that they face a common threat as detente has given way to
confrontation between the superpowers.17
Thus,
relations

both

"good

times"

have contributed

question in Germany.

to

and

"bad . times 11

a growing

in

reference to

East-West

preoccupation with the national

Ostpolitik and detente marked the beginning of a mutual
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self-discovery

process;

improved

relations

led

to

an

increase

in

self-confidence for both sides, along with domestic support for further
cooperation

in

areas

of

common

concern.

A subsequent

breakdown

in

communication between the superpowers seems to have strengthened German-German
detennination to hang on to gains long sought and painstakingly negotiated.
Has this turn for the worse in superpower relations, on the one hand, and
a growing public demand for further normal i za ti on, on the other, had any
observable impact on inter-German relations since 1979?

Can improvements in

FRG-GDR relations be divorced from the state of US-Soviet relations?

What

room for independent maneuvering do these two states find, and what risks are
they prepared to take to advance the cause of normalization?

These are the

questions addressed in the section below.
III.· Deutschlandpolitik as Damage-Limitation
Ostpol i ti k served to eliminate some of the more painful symptoms of
postwar division, but subsequent developments prove that it was not the
ultimate cure.

As Kiep points out, improved FRG-GDR relations "coincided with

a weakening of the desire

for

reunification

among Germans,

and as

a

consequence there was a tendency in many countries to misunderstand Ostpolitik
as being in itself a settlement of the German Question. 11 18
The foundation stone for a normalization of relations between the two
states was the Grundlagenvertrag ("Basis of Relations Treaty 11 ) initialed in.
December,

1972 and

implemented on 6.

June 1973.

Owing

to

superpower

entanglements in other parts of the world, notably Viet Nam, the Question of
postwar questions ceased to be source of urgent concern at the international
level •

On the domestic front, however, the pressures for change began to

build in the sixties~ especially in the Federal Republic.

The SPD and the FOP

were able to capitalize on the realization that Bonn's rigid adherence to a
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policy

of

non-recognition

of

11

the

socalled

GDR 11

was

materially, e.g., in the form of lost trade opportunities.

costing

the

FRG

More importantly,

the conservative leadership could not demonstrate to its own citizens that its
policies had actually led to substantial improvements in the quality of 1 ife
for Germans on the other side.19

The gains that East and West German leaders

hoped to derive from the Grundlagenvertrag were contradictory from the start.
The miracle is that both sides felt some 10 years later, th_at they had
achieved their respective objectives, at least partially.
For

the

GDR,

nonnalization.

It

the

Grundlagenvertrag

allowed

for

the

was

a

significant step towards

establishment

of

the

11

ties 11

judged_

necessary for implementing its own concept of "peaceful coexistence," defined as "the regulation of interstate relations between socialist and capitalist
countries based on equality between the states, mutual
sovereignty,

their

internal affairs. 11 20

territorial

integrity

and

respect for their

non-intervention

in

their

The de facto recognition of the GOR as a sovereign _state

moreover opened the door to diplomatic recognition internationally, lifting
restrictions

on

her

integration

organizations and global affairs.

and

participation

in

intergovernmental

International recognition was moreover a

sign that the FRG had failed in its efforts to isolate and discriminate
against the GDR; consequently, the FRG was compelled .to shift its own foreign
policy orientations.

Finally, the normalization of relations and the growing

sense of self-confidence it brought: to the leadership encouraged the GDR to
strengthen its grip on East Berlin, ·which it boldly proclaimed to be its
capital -city~
From the FRG' s per spec ti ve, the Grundl agenvertrag became an instrument
for the pursuit of further accords·, as well as the legal justification for
demandtng occasi.onal concessitins to alleviate the personal hardships born of

18

division.

The ten years following its promulgation proved that agreements and

treaties on single issues could be adopted on a step-by-step basis, despite
the diametrically opposed positions held regarding larger goals.

The treaty

established the necessary preconditions for the regulation of specifically
German problems in the context of international efforts to promote East-West
cooperation.

Thus,

both

German

states

could

render

contributions to the reduction of global tensions.

their

own

special

Further, the status of

West Berlin was secured in conjunction with the Quadripartite Agreement.
Finally, mindful

of the constitutional

imperative to uphold the goal

of

reunification, West- German leaders were satisfied that the language of the
11

Grundlagenv.ertrag left the German Question

open, 11 in juridical as well as in

political terms.21
These perceived successes notwithstanding, the Grundlagenvertrag has not
been without its strong critics on both sides; nor has it laid to rest serious
problems

of

interpretation

"citizenship" since 1972.
is

and

will

principally

remain

two-states-in-one-nation

to

the

national

question

and

For the Federal Republic, the German Question was,

"open; 11

"closed. 11 22

relating

for

The
thesis

the
GDR

to

German

leadership

a belief

Re pub l i C,

Democratic

in

has
two

shifted
German

it

is

from

a

nations,

one

capitalist, the other socialist, whose relations -- until 1983 -- were not to
differ from inter-national patterns elsewhere.

The FRG adheres to a belief

that two states with different social systems continue to comprise one nation.
Even once-reluctant conservatives have accepted Brandt 1 s 1969 thesis that,
11

al though

there

now exist two

states

in Germany,

they

are

not foreign

countries to each other, and their relations can only be of a special kind. 11 23
The

agreement

to

pursue

11

good,

neighborly

relations"

(later

institutionalized with the creation of permanent representative missions in
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Bonn and East Berlin in 1974) generated a flurry of negotiations between 1970
and 1975.
most

The result was a complicated network of accords and protocols, the

significant of which

differences
standstill

began

to

are

summarized

reassert

themselves

in negotiations until

in

Appendix A.

in

other

Irreconcilable

areas,

producing

a

late 1977. · Especially problematic issues

included legal standing and juridical proceedings, citizenship, the Prussian
"cultural possession" [art treasures], free exchanges of artists and writers,
cooperation in science and technology {which the GDR wanted to limit to the
natural , industry-relevant sciences), environmental protection, the Wall {and
automatic shooting devices along the border), and human rights.
Talks resumed in 1977 to determine what areas might have grown "ripe" for
further negotiations.

By this time existing agreements had already resulted
11

in a number of tangible improvements.

Success" was measured in terms of an

increased number of visitors, phone exchanges, expanded East German access to
West German media, transfer payments, trade balances and other items listed in
Appendix B.
In

1980,

the

East

German

leadership

abruptly

changed

its

course,

primarily in response to the destabilizing effects of the Polish crisis {and
not in direct relation to the NATO Double Decision).
GDR

Finance

Minister

unilaterally

doubled

the

In early October, the

minimal

currency exchange

requirement for visits to the East, and Premier Erich Honecker articulated a
set of non-negotiable demands at Gera.
further

normalization

were

to

The "unalterable prerequisites" for a

include

the

formal

recognition

of

GDR-citi zenshi p, the elimination of the Central Reporting Station on Border
Violations at Salzgitter ,24 the immediate regulation of a problematic El be
River border, and the upgrading of the permanent missions to embassy status
{based on the 2-nations thesis).
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An equally abrupt reversal occurred in 1981, as the NATO theater nuclear
decision increased in saliency and the topic of disarmament gained momentum as
a focal

point of German-German rel at ions.

East-Berlin, Honecker spoke of a possible

In a February, 1981 address in
11

unification 11 of the two German

states (albeit in more ominous than optimistic tones).25
fair

in

Leipzig,

he

proclaimed

that

difficulties

At the spring trade
afflicting

East-West

relations should not be permitted to disrupt German-German relations, as if
decoupling were a possibility.

Honecker then met twice with the new Permanent

Representative to East Berlin, Klaus Bolling -- in earlier years, such a
meeting

had

served

as

a

prelude

to

new

negotiations.

The

former

Representative Gunter Gaus, reporting and writing on his own experiences in
the East, began to call upon West Germa:n · citizens to learn more about the
11

GDR, and to stop treating

the other Germans 11 as an invisible albeit hostile

phenomenon.26
The German-German dialogue not only resumed, it actually intensified.
The imposition of martial

law in Poland cut short a Werbellinsee summit

meeting between Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker, 11-13. December 1981.
degree

of consensus

reached

substantial:

No

new

international

situation

treaty,
did

on

a number of
but

not

key

a _mutual

deteriorate

points

understanding
further,

a

normalization efforts between the two states was possible.
found in the joint communique, stressed that

was

11

1 aunched from German soil. 11 27

nonetheless

that

if

continuation

the
of

A second point,

both sides are conscious of

their great responsibility for securing the peace in Europe. 11
least, both leaders reiterated their conviction,

The

11

Last but not

that war can never again be

Honecker• s recornmendati ons for disarmament and

rumblings against pending NATO deployments·were presented in the GDR-media as
a

11

Program for a Constructive Contribution by both German States to Peace and

;!
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Disarmament 11 [my emphasis].28
Schmidt was compelled to devote ever more energy to the irreconcilable
differences besetting his own party in relation to the deployment question.
Honecker accepted an invitation to visit in 1982 (no concrete date was set)
and thereafter stepped out front as Oeutschlandpolitik's most active proponent
-- in stark contrast to the rec al ci trant, even bocki g posture assumed by the
East
11

German

Premier

at

the

outset

of

Ostpolitik.

Program 11 had no Federal Republican match.

Honecker's

detailed

He urged both states to support:

earnest and substantial negotiations between the USSR and the USA
concerning

questions

on medium-range

nuclear missiles,

so

that

tangible results can be attained in the shortest time possible; an
- agreement

on

a

moratorium

for

the

duration

of

the

Geneva

negotiations over the deployment of new medium-range missiles in
Europe ••• ;

a

prohibition

on

the

neutron

bomb;

adoption

of

a

declaration for the denunciation of first-strike use of nuclear
weapons ••• ; continuation of the SALT-process; the convening of a
conference on the relaxation of military tensions and disarmament
through the Madrid meetings; formulation of an initial agreement at
the

Vienna

negotiations

to

exclude

nonreconcilable

issues;

preparation of the second special session of the UN on disarmament
through the Geneva Committee [ which wi 11 deal] above all with a halt
to -all

nuclear weapons

testing,

a ban

on

neutron weapons,

on

chemical and radiological weapons, as well as with the strengthening
of a security-guarantee for the non-nuclear states.29

1,

f'

Reconciliatory gestures foll owed rhetorical

appeals.

On 11. February

1982, the GDR expanded its catalogue of "pressing family matters," used to
permit E.ast Germans to make emergency trips to the West·.

December marked the
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tenth anniversary of the Grundl agenvertrag, but by then the party responsible
for its inception, the SPD, had already been forced from the political stage
in Bonn.

The next question to arise was what changes, if any, would accompany

the CDU I s return to power in -1982-1983 _.,; the party that had once vehemently
opposed the whole concept of Os tpo li ti k.
Given the ferocity of its assaults on Brandt's initiatives between 1969
and 1972, the reinstated CDU/CSU government displayed surprising restraint
during its first year in office, even though this period witnessed a dramatic
escalation in tensions between the superpowers.

In his inaugural address to

the Bundestag on 13. October 1982, the new Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, confirmed
his interest in a continuing German-German dialogue at all levels.

Even the

CDU candidate who had sought to unseat Brandt through a non-confidence vote in

1971,

Rainer

Barzel,

emphasized

that

the

new

"discussion, not polemics, results, not headlines. 11 30

government

would

seek

In light of sentiments

expressed during the June, 1983 debate over the Government's Report on the
State of the·wation, the new administration had no real alternative but to
continue implementing existing policies.
The international climate, as well

as the domestic political-economic

picture, had changed considerably since 1969; moreover, public acceptance of
Ostpolitik had acquired a more or less permanent character.

Kohl sought to

accommodate a small but vociferous anti-conciliatory faction within his own
party by adopting the . formula

11

conti nui ty with new accents. 11

Hidden behind

the new label was nonetheless a dual strategy; the first strategic component
was declarative in nature, paying unbending, rhetorical homage to ·the goals of
self-determination and the "unity of the nation. 11

The second element involved

a more pragmatic. approach, a continuation of the step-by-step "politics of
negotiation" practiced since 1970.
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The first
special

11

new accent 11 came into play less than six months after the

elections confirming Kohl's selection as

Chancellor.

To

almost

everyone's surprise, Franz Josef Strauss -- once a most vehement critic of
Ostpolitik -- traveled to East Berlin and arranged for a spectacular OM 1
billion credit deal

in July,

1983.

Neither

the

amount nor

the

credit

mechanism utilized was all that extraordinary; but the fact that the normally
belligerent Strauss undertook this deal without first seeking the approval of
the CSU's sister party, the CDU, amazed the opposition and gave rise to public
expressions of irritation among members of the government.
own

brand

of

continuity

which

rested

on

The CDU had its

the

principle

Lei stung-Gegenl ei stung ( "you scratch my back, I' 11 scratch yours'') •

of

Strauss

was criticized by his own for having extended the credits without demanding
immediate concessions.

At least one analyst has argued that Strauss' behavior

can be interpreted as an act of ·11 preemptive compensation, 11 that is, an attempt
to bolster German-German relations in anticipation of a marked deterioration
likely to follow the Euromissile deployments.31
voluntary,

11

Indeed, concessions of a

preemptive 11 nature were not limited to one issue, nor to one

state.
As deployments neared, the efforts to communicate seemed to increase
exponentially.

In

opposition-leader

August,

Honecker

Hans-Jochen

shuttle-diplomat, Egon Bahr.

rolled

Vogel

and

out

the

for

welcome

mat

Ostpolitik's

for

former

The GDR invited Bundesprasident Karl Carstens to

attend the·Luther anniversary celebrations in East-Berlin (he declined for
reasons
delegates

of

location).
to

visit

the

Vogel

proposed

Bundestag,

protection treaty were resumed.

and

inviting

East

negotiations

German
on

an

Volkskammer
environmental

In September, 1983, the GDR announced the

elimination of the minimum daily currency exchange requirement for children
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aged 6-14, with a later reduction for pensioners from DM 25 to DM 15.

Once

deployments commenced in December, it was Erich Honecker who began to speak of·
a Verantwortungsgemeinschaft

("community

of

responsibiliti'),

while Kohl

cal 1ed for a "partnershi p of reason" and the SPD stressed the need for a
"security partnership. 11 32
In February, 1984, all

Bundestag parties (with the exception of the

Greens) agreed to support a common foundation for what had become a two-way
Deutschlandpolitik.

The document to which they lent their approval began:

"Our land is divided, but the German nation continues to exist ••• We cannot
change this condition by our own power.

We can only make it more bearable.

This condition will only be changed within the framework of· a durable peace
order in Europe."33

Kohl and Honecker met for two hours on the occasion of

Andropov's funeral

in Moscow, with Honecker commenting that the GDR was

prep a red

II

to

do

everything

in

its

power

to

build

down

the

existing

international dangers. 11 34
Chernenko's return to a hard-line stance toward the West, in addition to
the counter-deployment of tactical nuclear devices on East German soil, should
have lessened the willingness to "dialogue" and should have acted as a
constraint on Honecker's room to maneuver.

Instead, these developments merely

seemed to strengthen his resolve to intensify German-German communication.
Rather than settle in to a new ice-age, Honecker immediately embarked on a
course of. "damage 1imitation, 11 meeting with Strauss, Lambsdorff, Zeyer and
Lafontaine

in

the

spring

of 1984

and

allowing

letters

from

religious

dissidents who condemned the counter deplo~Tients at home to be printed up in
Neues Deutschland.35

Moscow's decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympic

games came as a harshblow to the "sports-state GDR."

Honecker jabbed back by

replacing four pro-Moscovites in the SEO Politburo with personal supporters,
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II

including

independent 11 Herb-ert Haber, a specialist responsible for rel at ions

with the Federal Republic.
The Kohl

government, meanwhile, was charged with ineptly handling an

additional DM 950 million credit deal which inadvertently

11

overlooked 11 the

exclusion of Berlin in the concessionary easing of travel restrictions.36

It

had done a much better job of averting a near-catastrophe during the spring
and summer of 1984 when 18 GDR citizens occupied the US mission in East Berlin
and later 161 asylum seekers implanted themselves in the West German embassy
in Prague.

Despite the fact that

CDU/CSU' s list of

11

II

free movement" and human rights head the

non-negoti abl e 11 demands, the Bonn government adopted a

sensitive, low-key response; the crisis was successfully resolved without a
loss of face for either side.

During the first half of 1984, the GDR opened

the gates to 31,352 Germans seeking to resettle in the West, up to 40,000 by
the end of the year.

It also dismantled automatic firing devices along 175.7

kilometers (40 percent) of the inter-German border.37
Paradoxically, one development that should have contributed to a /urthe}'.'
cementing
11

of

German-German

rapprochement_ began

to

chip

away

at

the

partnership of reason 11 upheld- by Kohl and embraced by Honecker throughout

1984.
Federal

The East German Premier's decision to accept an invitation to visit the
Republic for the first-time (since leaving his birthplace in the

Saarland)

soon became a tool

for poisoning the climate

anti-reconciliation elements in Kohl I s own camp.
officials
Dregger I s

engaged
11

in

.11 unworthy

and

in the hands of

High-ranking conservative

denigrating 11

pronouncements

[e.g.,

our future doesn I t depend on the honor' of a visit- by Mr. Honecker 11 ]

and also began to question publicly the sanctity of the 0der-Neisse border
with Poland.38
start,

Moscow

Far from enthused about Honecker's pending visit from the
availed

itself

of

an

opportunity

to

hurtle

charges -of

26

11

revanchism 11 toward Bonn (actually thinly disguised admonitions directed at

East-Berlin).

In an act of rather courageous defiance, Neues Deutschland

failed to fall

in line by automatically reprinting harsh criticisms from

Pravda.
The

discrepancies

activities, 11
unwilling

the

between Kohl's

"Sunday

two elements of the dual

and/or

unable

to

muzzle

ultra-conservative. wing of his party.

sermons

and

work-week

strategy, made the Chancellor
the

increasingly

vociferous

Honecker withstood intense pressure

from Moscow up until two weeks prior to the scheduled visit; but ultimately,
"East-Berlin dared too much, Bonn helped too little. 11 39
In short order, Kohl's policy of "continuity with new accents" gave way
to the practice of "continuity with old accents. 11
and

pundits

charged

Kohl

with

permitting

Deutschl andpol i ti k concept of his own. 40
that

11

Moderates among journalists
polemics

for

lack

of

a

By December, 1984, pronouncements

the existing situation, the core of the East-treaties must be changed,"

and a new emphasis on "the openness of the German Question," began to raise
doubts about 11 continuity 11 altogether.41
After January, 1985, it became almost impossible to discern elements of
11

partnership 11 and

11

reason 11

conservative government.

in either the rhetoric or the actions of the

stage in January when Kohl
reunion

of

postwar

11

The

accepted an invitation to address the annual

refugees

ignorance of their theme

11

nati onal question" was swept back on to center

from

the

Eastern

border

regions.

Claiming

Schlesien remains ours 11 (an explicit demand for a

return to pre-1937 borders), the Chancellor refused to back down, pushing
instead for a revised motto,

11

40 years of banishment - Schlesien remains our

future - in a Europe of free peoples. 11 42
slowing

down

the

pace

of

diplomatic

Apparently not content with merely
initiatives

towards

the

GDR,
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ultraconservative elements seemed to have little trouble jostling Kohl into a
policy of "continuity with new barriers" that amounted to an assault on
FRG-East European relations in general.
to Pol and were cane ell ed;

Two regularly scheduled state visits

Bulgaria, Romani a and Hungary expressed serious

concern to visiting Willy Brandt.

Observer Peter Bender noted the "democratic

arrogance" of the older conservatives behind the Sehl esien-affai r who were
intent on

freeing

the

Poles

in

1985,

as

if

Germans

had

liberated

and

democratized themselves in 1945.43
With the nationalist and anti-communist flags being hoisted side-by-side
in

Bonn,

the

fortieth

anniversary

of

the

war's

end

acquired

greater

significance as a propaganda device than as an opportunity for advancing the
idea of a "community of responsibility" serving the cause of European peace.
Kohl

sought to

play the event two ways

by calling

for

quiet

observations, on the one hand, while proclaiming, on the other,
world will look at Germany on May Bth. 11 44
Bitburg

cemetery,

the

Chancellor

religious
11

the whole

By inviting Reagan to visit _the

turned

the

second

point

into

a

self-fulfilling prophecy.
Kohl's ambivalence regarding the

11

openness 11 of the German Question versus

the permanenc_e of the postwar borders appears to substantiate the critics 1
charges that he seeks a German "commonality without a solid concept. 11 45

One

possible interpretation accounting for the dramatic shifts in word and deed
between 1983 and 1985 may be that Kohl, as a newcomer to national office,
recognized

the post deployment period for what it was,

namely a grave,

immediate threat to the gains made in FRG-GDR relations over a period of ten
years.

By mid-1984, the euphoria of the conservatives• return to power after

13 years wore thin, and Kohl was hard pressed to span the gap between factions
within the CDU/CSU camp.

After the scheduling of the Schulz-Gromyko visit in
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January and the announcement that the US and the Soviet Uni on would return to
the negotiating table in March, 1985, Kohl could presume that the worst of the
East-West crisis had passed; hence, he was free to go back to
usual . 11

11

business as

Too young to have participated personally in the events of 1933-1945,

he appears to be caught between a desire to exonerate the postwar generations
of a direct responsibility for the Nazi experiences, while trying to convince
the global community that the lessons of that period have been duly learned
and accepted :-- except for the permanent division of the German nation-state,
that is.
For Honecker, on the other hand, the 1983 deployments seem to have marked
a critical political as well as a conceptual turning point.

As late as 1980,

the GDR leadership demonstrated at Gera that a serious destabilization in the
region or an all-too-eager FRG compliance with pl ans for a further arms
build-up could and would put the GDR back on the offenside-defensive path of
demarcation (Abgrenzung).
on East
only

The first (known) tactical nuclear weapons deployed

$erijian soil as a counter

increased

the GDR's

'

to Pershing I I and cruise missiles in 1983 not

physical

vulnerability --

it probably meant a

tightening of the reins from Moscow, itself made insecure by the unresolved
leadership

succession

question.

Unlike

Kohl,

Honecker

spent

the

years

1935-1945 in a Nazi prison, and is inclined to see in the German division a
barrier against resurgent

fasi: 'fsm _-0

just as the twentieth passing of 13.

August 1961 was noted in East Berlin with banners supporting the
protection wall. 11

11

anti-fascist

Reformist Gorbachev's rapid but smooth rise _to the top in

the Soviet Union has _given the East German Premier grounds for cautious
optimism.

In

recent months

Honecker

has

cleverly

resorted

to courting

prominent SPD figures, ever since Social Democratic electoral victories in the
Saarl and and· Northrhei n-Westphal i a have put the SPD back in the running for
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the Chancellor race in 1987.46
Instead of resorting to

11

busi ness as usual , 11 Honecker has emerged from

the initial deployment crisis a more self-confident statesperson intent on
quietly improving relations with other states in the region.
government has struggled to pull

itself by the

pigtail

While the Bonn
out of its

own

nationalist (but certainly not neutralist) quagmire, Honecker has met with
other potential, anti-deployment partners from Austda, Japan, Canada, Greece,
Spain and Italy, including the Pope.47
disarmament,

His favorite themes are reportedly

renunciation of first strike,

renunciation of force and the

creation of nuclear-free zones.
In his apparent effort to push for a "club of small nations, 11 Honecker
seems to be venting

11

a deep-seated neutralist instinct" [s_ource:

Foreign Minister Genscher].

West German

It is by design, not coincidence, that Honecker

has been photographed with prominent national-neutralists from the West German
anti-nuclear movements, e.g., Petra Kelly, Gert Bastian, Jo Leinen and Oskar
He is apparently willing to incur the risk of adding momentum to

Lafontaine.

the unofficial peace and ecology movements springing up at home -- a sign of
growing confidence in his own leadership capabilities, based on perceived
public support for his diplomatic ini~iatives.
Western observer, East German citizens

11

In the evaluation of one

woul d like most of all to pack up

their country and build it up anywhere else, far outside the pull of the power
blocs. 11 48

More realistically, Honecker has chosen to cultivate an emergent

"fundamental understanding, if not consensus, a respect and a feeling of not
yet clearly definable,
Germani es .49

but nonetheless common interests" between the two

The key to a further improvement in German-German relations is

seen to rest in the concept of the Verantwortungsgemeinschaft, explored in the
concluding section below.
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IV.

Whither Deutschlandpolitik?

11

Responsibility 11 Redefined

Implicit in the concept of a Verantwortungsgemei nschaft ( "community of
responsibiliti') is the belief that answers to the German national question
and the search for effective peace-~eepi ng mechanisms throughout Europe are
inexorably linked.

As Brandt maintained in 1969:

The practical political test that now lies ahead of us in upcoming
years will be to secure the unity of the nation, to see that the
relationship between the parts of Germany are relieved of their
present cramping.

The Germans are not only bound together through

their language and their history -- with its glory and misery.
all find our home in Germany.
a

common

responsibility:

We

We also have further common tasks and
toward

the

peace

around

us

and

in

Europe.SO
Improvements in German-German relations since 1969 have steered clear of
directly promoting the unity of the nation, but this has not prevented the two
states from establishing a complicated network of legal, economic, cultural
and environmental

ties.

Leaders in both states acknowledge that the best

approach to normalization is a multi-faceted one, and that negotiations to
date have had a cumulative effect on their wil 1 i ngness to cooperate further.
Each side must not only recognize the special stakes confronting the other;
the two

states have also come to

separating

Deutschl and

from

the

realize that there are special
rest

of

Central

Europe.

As

stakes
Bruns

hypothesizes, the stronger the emphasis on mutual interests and the larger the
number of reciprocal

benefits that can be built into

the mechanisms for

cooperation, the more likely and the more effective the implementation of
treaties, accords and exchanges will become.51
The successes to date and the recognition of mutual interests give rise
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to a new set of questions for the 1980 s and beyond.

The two Germanies have

1

built up a legally complex "zone of activity," but have yet to develop a
positive concept of peace:

even if the absence-of-war is a satisfactory state

of affairs for the other powers of Europe, for the Germans-divided this will
not suffice.

What is the

goal

of oeutschlandp_olitik?

improvements in German-German relations supposed to lead?

Where

are

the

What is to be the

mutually acceptable strategy, and \-Jhat further, concrete steps will follow
from that strategy?

How can a variety of ostensibly irreconcilable interests

of the two states be so connected with each other so as to provide a set of
mutual incentives to a further normalization of their interactions.
the

two

states have made

the critical

transition

from

Thus far,

a strategy of

Gegeneinander (against-each other) to one Nebeneinander (next-to-each-other);
at issue is whether both are able and willing to cross the threshold to a
strategy of Miteinander (with-one-another}.
Clearly these questions are the

11

stuff 11 out of which dissertations are

made -- they cannot all be adequately answered here.

One reason there can be

no definitive solution to the German Problem is because ultimately the
decisions will not be_ left up to the two states themselves.

The actions of

the GDR leadership toward ·the FRG depend in part on the behavior of the West
German

1eadershi p.

function

At the same time, Honecker's freedom to maneuver is a

of and a reflex

reaction

to

internal

political

developments.

Problems of legitimacy within have sooner resulted in policies aimed at
isolating the GDR citizenry from disruptive external influences; Abgrenzung
(demarcation) was the vehicle by which the GDR sought to establish its status
as a sovereign

nation-state.

It therefore appears

that an

internally

consolidated, self-confident East German 1eadershi p would be a much more
flexible, amenable negotiations partner for the FRG than
an insecure one.
',

In
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this respect, the best strategy for Bonn would be to undertake measures that
ensure internal stability and grant external recognition to the government in
East Berlin.
course,

the

The final, critical variable determining GDR behavior is, of
Soviet Union, which

is

not beyond

using

an

improvement in·

German-German relations to service its own political-economic needs.
The Federal Republic has had less qualms about its

11

right to exist" ever

since the promulgation of the Basic law, that is, fewer problems establishing
11

its legitimacy internally, despite the
itself in the constitutional

preamble.

provisional

status" it defined for

Bonn's behavior towards the other

German state seems to have been less dependent on GDR actions towards the FRG
and more subject to influence by the balance of party-political forces.

o.c.,

certainly sensitive to pressures from Washington,

While

FRG officials have

been able to fall back on the European Community and diverse positions held by
NATO alliance members to guarantee a greater degree of autonomy in the conduct
of foreign policy since the late 1960's.
It is somewhat ironic that Honecker would develop the most persistent
sales-pitch
reasons.
people

for

the

notion

of a

11

community of

First, the GDR abjures the principle of
within

its

own

borders

are

11

responsibility,"

two

collective guilt 11 as far as

concerned.

historical as well as a futuristic dimension.

for

11

Responsibility 11

has

an

Considering itself the bastion

of anti-fascist resistance, the GDR has divorced itself from the events of
1933-1945; but recent efforts to rehabilitate Luther and even Bismarck are
difficult to justify, since no

11

normal

II

state can selectively identify with

its own hi stori cal and cultural legacy in this fashion.

Ho nee ker tends to

emphasize

two Germanies

preventing

the
the

present and future
outbreak

of

a

responsibility

third

world

war.

of

the

Secondly,

the

idea

in
of

Gemeinschaft implies something closer than a set of inter-national relations.
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The GDR which has long eschewed the existence of a "special relationship" and
has insisted upon its sovereignty:' as a nation, now seeks to promote an
international/regional recognition of that "special relationship."
Through
Federal

its

postwar

Republic

has

victims of Nazism.

indemnification

acknowledged

policies

historical

(Wiedergutmachung),

responsibility

towards

the'
the

Its integration into the Western bloc is upheld as a

device for avoiding a repetition of that dark chapter in German history.
Paradoxically, those who would suggest that the division is not a permanent
condition are accused of treason (e.g. former Minister of Justice, Jurgen
Schmude) 52 -- but how a reunified Germany ·would do more to secure the future
of peace

in Europe

alternatively,

is never spelled out.

The belief in

11

community 11 or

in two-states-in-one-nation has not been borne out by the

earlier practices of ignoring or denying the "so-called GDR 1 s 11 existence; nor
has it been supported by the

11

cooperati ve i ndi fference 11 or the widespread

ignorance about conditions there underlined by Gaus.53
The Verantwortungsgemei nschaft strikes a respondent chord among peace
activists in both states, producing support for both the "community" and the
11

responsibility 11 components.

"neutralism

is

no

As Greens' spokesperson Antje Vollmer contents,

curseword"

[it

is]

rather

a

legitimate

political

possibility for two German states who draw their lesson out of their common
history. 11 54

The situation of the 1980' s necessitates something more than a

return to the ohne mi ch neutralist sentiments of the 1950 1 s.
implies
process.

an

active

pursuit of

cooperative

relations,

11

Communi ty

11

not a dropping-out

Prominent SPD member Herbert Wehner speaks of an inneres Ausland, an

untranslatable phrase positioning FRG-GDR exchanges halfway between intrawith intersystemic relations.55
German-German relations were characterized by i sol at ion and demarcation
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during the fifties, followed by direct ideological confrontation during the
sixties.

The paradigm shifted with Ostpolitik, rendering normalization the

strategy for the seventies.
lost their glow.

The diplomatic innovations of that period have

The eighties threaten to become an era of ,-tqtAt/inized and

administered relations, should the Verantwortungsgemeinschaft fail to provide
new directions.
The

controversies

surrounding

Reagan's

Bitburg

visit

and

Kohl I s

attendance at the Schlesien reunion did not in and of themselves resurrect the
"national question."

Nor have the East and West German peace movements alone

reopened Pandora's box.

The lid was never fully closed.

Weidenfeld argues

rather convincingly that the Lautstarke (loudness) of the present debate over
the

born-again

perspectives
questions,

11

--

German
the

Question
need

for

signals
bona fide

the

waning

postwar

of

identity

past

political

combines

where are we coming from? 11 and llwhere are we going? 11 56

the

Schweigler

is no doubt correct in asserting the existence of separate FRG- and GDRi den ti ties, both of which all ow successor generations to comprehend from
whence they came.57

This does not preclude the possibility of a second

identification

with

a

responsibility

for

its

exacerbated international
anni hi 1 ati on, the more

larger
own

community

security

in

that
the

seeks
future.

to
In

assume
a

greater

climate

of

tensions, against a backdrop of possible nuclear
important question for

permanently-provisional systems remains:

the citizens of these two

Oeutschlandpolitik wohin?

35

Appendix A

Major German-German Negotiations and Signed Accords, 1970-1979
- Accord over

the

Regulation

of

Costs

for Postal

and Telecommunication

Services (20. April 1970)
- Protocol

for

the

Negotiations

Regulating Postal

and Telecommunications

Traffic (30. September 1971)
- Treaty regarding Questions of Transport (25. May 1972)
- Treaty over the Basis of Relations (Grundlagenvertrag) from 21. December
1972
- Accords regarding the Principles for Detoxification and Preservation of
Water Resources on the Borders (20. September 1973) [speci fie negotiations
have ensued regarding water-quality for the Spree and the Havel (Berlin),
the Elbe, the Werra-Weser and the Roden (Coburg)]
- Protocol regarding the Establishment of Permanent Diplomatic Missions (14.
March 1974)
- Accords regarding the Transfer of Personal Support Payments and Personal
Estates in Special Cases (25. April 1974)
- Protocol over the Regulation of Sports Relationships between the Deutschen
Sportbund and the Deutschen Turn- und Sportbund (8. May 1974)
- Agreement in the field of Public Health (25. April 1974)
- Agreement regarding Fishing Limits in one part of the Lubecker Bay (29. June
1974)
- Protocol Note regarding the Positioning of the Borders between the Coastal
Waters of the FRG and the Coastal Waters of the GDR (29.6.1974)
- Accords regarding Improvements in the Traffic Thoroughfares to and from
Berlin-West (19. December 1975)
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- Agreement regulating the area of Postal and Telecommunication Services (30.
March 1976)
- Accords governing the Cross-border Mining of Brown Coal in the Locale of
Helmstedt/Harbke (29. May 1976)
- Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic on Tax and Fee Exemptions for Street Vehicles; Protocol for a
Comprehensive Payment for Personal Vehicles utilizing Thoroughfares in the
GDR (31. October 1979).
- Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic over the Construe ti on of the North-Autobahn Berlin-Hamburg; the
Repair of the Transit Canal to Berlin and the Reopening of the Teltow Canal;
the Determination of Transit Visa Fees from 1980 to 1989 and Currency
Transfers (16. November 1978)
Agreement regarding Cooperation in the field of Veterinary Medicine (21.
December 1979)
Negotiations over the Canel usion of Treaties concerning Legal Processes
(since 10. October 1973)
- Negotiations on the Conclusion of Treaties over Non-commercial Payment and
Financial Accounting Processes (since 10. October 1973)
- Negotiations on the Conclusion of an Agreement for Environmental Protection
(begun 29. November 1973)
Negotiations on the Canel usion of an Agreement Promoting Cooperation in the
fields of Science and Technology (begun 30. November 1973)
- Negotiations on the Conclusion of an Agreement for Culture (since 27.
November 1973)
- Negotiations regarding Economic Questions (ongoing)
- Meeting of the Experts regarding Traffic near the Borders (ongoing)
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- Negotiations over the Improvement of Transportation Ties between Berlin and
the Federal Republic
Negotiations over the Use of Natural Gas Discoveries in Wustrow/Salzwedel
Agreements Pertaining to the Status of Berlin
- Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (3. September 1971)
- Agreement regulating Traffic to and from Berlin-West (l7. December 1971)
- Agreement between the Berlin Senat and the Government of the GbR regarding
Travel and Visitor Traff fr, and the Regulation of the Question of Encl aves
(20. December 1971)

Bilateral and International Treaties Related to Ostpolitik
- Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics renouncing the Use of Force and Normalizing Relations
(12. August 1970)

- Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of
Poland over the Basic Principles · for

the Normalization of Reciprocal

Relations (7. December 1970)
- Treaty over the Reciprocal Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia (11. December 1973)
Helsinki Accords, concluding the Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (1. August 1975)
- Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Reciprocal Support between the GDR and
the USSR (7. October 1975)
- Communique of a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO:
Theater Nuclear Forces, December 12, 1979.
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Appendix B
Spill-over effects and Quality-of-life Improvements deriving from
the Basis of Relations Treaty of 21. December 1972
- Number of FRG Tourists Visiting the GDR
pre-1971:

none

1981:

130,000

- Number of trips made into the GDR from the FRG
1970:

1.2 million

1982:

2.9 million

- Visits made by West Berliners to East Berlin and the GDR
pre-1972:

only with special
passes

1982:

1.7 million

(before mandatory currency exchange
increase, 1972: 3.1 million)

- Day Excursions in GDR border-areas
pre-1972:

none

1982:

300,000

- Reunification of Families:
40,000 resettled in the West since 1970
- Visits by GDR relatives to the FRG ·
1982:

1.55 million pensioners
46,000 below retirement age for special family events

- Traffic from and to Berlin
1970:

7.2 million

1982:

19.5 million

- Telephone exchanges
pre 1971:
1981:

34 lines FRG-GDR, none between Berlin West and East
1,421 lines FRG-GDR, (24 million calls, of which

11.4 million occur between the two Berlins)
- Inner-Gem1an trade volume
pre 1971:
1981:

DM 4.5 billion

DM 14 billion
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In the 1980's, some 6,000 West German firms sign an estimated
50,000 individual contracts annually

40

Footnotes
1.

These

statements were made

respectively,

following

by

Helmut

their

Schmidt and

December

1981

Erich

summit

Honecker,

meeting

at

Werbellinsee, GDR.
2.

Michael Sturmer, "Kein Eigentum der Deutschen:
Werner

Weidenfeld,

Hrsg.,

Die deutsche Frage, 11 in

Die Identitat der Deutschen

Hanser, 1983), pp. 83-101; further, Richard Lowenthal,

(Munchen:
11

Carl

Stabi l i tat ohne

Vom Selbstverstandnis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 11 Der

Sicherheit.

Monat, Heft 1, 1978.

Also, Jurgen Leinemann, Die Angst der Deutschen.

Beobachtungen zur Bewusstseinslage der Nation (Reinbeck bei

Hamburg:

Rowohlt, 1982).
3.

The West Germany weekly Die Zeit has run a series of debates pertaining to
the national problem, as well as a number of interpretive essays on the
significance of the 8th of May 1985.

For a sample, see articles by Theo

Sommer (24. August 1984; 1. January 1985); Saul Friedlander (15. February·
1985); Karl Kaiser (6. April 1984); Karl-Heinz Janssen (12. April 1985);
Michael Sturmer (1. February 1985).
Armin

For a more extreme perspective, see

Mohler, Vergangenheitsbewaltigung,

3.

Auflage

(Krefeld:

Sinus,

1980}.
4.

Helga

Pross,

Was ist heute deutsch?

Bundesrepublik (Reinbeck bei Hamburg:
ist typisch deutsch?

Rowohlt, 1982}; Rainer Roth, Was

Die Deutschen - Image und Selbstverstandnis

Ploetz,· 1979}; Anton Peisl

(Freiburg:

Wertorientierung in der

and Armin Mohler, Hrsg., Die

deutsche Neurose - Uber die beschadigte Identitat der Deutschen (Frankfurt
a.M.:

Ullstein, 1980}.

Malinkrodt,

11

On the

issue of anti-Gennanism,

see Anita

Medienberichterstattung uber die Bundesrepublik in den USA,

Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 829-30/84, 21. July 1984, pp. 15-29.

11

41

5.

Pierre Hassner,

11

Zwei

deutsche. Staaten in Europa.

Gibt es gemeinsame

Interessen in der internationalen Politik? 11 in Weidenfeld, op. cit., p.
300.
6.

Ibid., p. 298.

7.

Joyce Marie Mushaben,
the

National

11

Question

Security and the Successor Geherati ans:
in

the

East

and

West German

Youth and

Peace Movements 11

(forthcoming 1985).
8.

For a detailed chronology, see Joyce M. Mushaben,
in West Germany:

11

Cycles of Peace Protest

Experiences from Three Decades, 11 West European Politics

8 (January 1985) pp. 24-40; and, "Swords to Plowshares:
State

and

the . East

German

Peace

Movement, 11

The Church, the

St.udies in Comparative

Communism XVII (Summer 1984), pp. 123-135.
9.

Mushaben,

11

Cycles ••• , 11 ibid.

10.

Mushaben,

11

Swords to Plowshares .•• , 11 lac. cit., Wolfgang Buscher and Peter

Wensierski,

Null Bock auf DOR - Austeigerjugend im anderen Deutschland

(Reinbeck bei Hamburg:
11.

11

Rowohlt, 1984).

Regierungserkl arung van Bundeskanzl er Willy Brandt am 28. Oktober 1969, 11

cited

in

the

documentation,

Die Deutsche Frage,

Landeszentrale fur politische Bildung, Hrsg. (Hannover:
12.

Peter Brandt and Herbert

1981);

and,

1982), p. 115.

Ammon, Hrsg., Die Linke und die nati anal e Frage

Dokumente zur deutschen Einhett seit 1945
Rowohlt,

Niedersachsische

Arbeitsgruppe

Berlin-

(Reinbeck
und

bei

Hamburg:

Deutschlandpolitlk

-

Alternative Liste, Hrsg., Paktfreiheit fur beide deutsche Staaten oder Bis
dass der Tod uns eint? Berlin, 1982.
13.

Paktfreiheit, ibid., p. 114.

14.

Oskar · Lafontaine,

Angst var den Freunden.

Die Atomwaffen-Strategie der

Supermachte zerstort die Bundnisse (Reinbeck bei Hamburg:

Rowohlt, 1983).

42

15.

This letter is reprinted in Wolfgang Buscher, Peter Wensierski and Klaus
Wolschner,

Friedensbewegung in der DOR - Texte 1978~1982

(Hattingen: ·

Edition Transit, 1982), pp. 181-184.
16.

Eppelmann's app·eal

also appears in Buscher et al., Friedensbewegung ••• ;

ibid., pp. 178-180.
17.

Richard Lowenthal,

11

The German Question Transformed, 11 Foreign Affairs,

Winter 1984/85, p. 313.
18.

Walther

Leisler

Kiep,

11

The

New

Deutschlandpolitik, 11

Foreign Affairs,

Winter 1984/85, p. 316.
19.

Wilhelm

Bruns,

Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen.

Perspektiven (Opladen:

Pramissen - Probleme -

Leske, 1984), p. 30.

20.

Ibid., pp. 45-46.

21.

Ibid., p. 34.

22.

Two sample statements by prominent politicians in 1975 illustrate the gap
between

their

respective
11

Genscher (FRG):

respect

to

Foreign

Minister

Han-Dietrich

We cannot accept division as the last word of history

over the German nation. 11
"With

positions.

the

rendered her decisioti. 11

Contrast, Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer (GDR):
national

question

on German

soil,

hi'story

has

Both are cited by Bruns, loc. cit., p. 37.

23.

11

24.

Salzgitter is a symbolic irritant, the number of border incidents reported

Regierungserklarung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt 11 , op. cit., p. 115.

having dropped to almost zero.

See Dietrich Strothmann,

11

Unsere Ausbeute

ist Gleich Null - Streit um Salzgitter," Die Zeit, March, 1984.
25.

Bruns, op. cit., p. 126; Neues Deutschland, 16. February 1981, p. 3

26.

Gunter

Gaus,

Wo Deutschland liegt - Eine Ortsbestimmung

(Hamburg:

Hoffmann und Campe, 1983), and Die Zeit, 30. January 1981, p. 3ff.
27.

Cited in Bruns, op. cit., p. 141.

43

28.

Bruns, op. cit., p. 142; Neues Deutschland, 16. December 1981, p. lff.

29.

Ibid.

30.

Bruns, op. cit., p. 146.

31.

Bruns himself takes this position, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

32.

Elizabeth

Pond,

"Finding

Detente

in

unlikely

places,"

The Christian

Science Monitor, 22. February 1984.
33.

Mari on Grafi n Donhoff; "Zuvi el der Sorge, zuviel der Hoffnung - Was i st
Jos mit den Deutschen?" Die Zeit, 23. March 1984, p. 1.

34.

Joachim

Nawrocki,

"Die

Freiheit

des

treuen

Vasallen.

Trotz

der

Raketenstationierung betr.eibt Ost-Berlin umsichtig Westpolitik," Die Zeit,
2. March 1984.
35.

Christian Schmidt-Hauer, "Der lange Papierkrieg der roten Bruder - Die
Chroni k der Krise zwi schen dem Kreml und die ostdeutschen Kommuni sten, 11
Die Zeit, 17. August 1984; Neues Deutsland, 17. August - 14. September
1984;

36.

Joachim Nawrocki, "Berlin Kommit zu kurz - Die neuen Besuchsregelungen:
Hat Bonn schlecht verhandelt? 11

37.

Kiep, op. cit., pp. 317-318.

38.

Rolf Zundel,

11

Die Zeit, 17. August 1984.

Herbe Spruche und ein wenig Trauer -

Jetzt gerat der

deutschl and pol i ti sche Kon sens in gefahr 11 Die Zeit, 14. September 1984;
also., Marlies Menge,
dass

die

11

Wie steht er jetzt den da?

deutsch-deutsche

Beziehungen

leiden

Die Sorge ist gross,

mussen, 11

Die Zeit,

14.

Di e Lehre fur die Deutschen - Honeckers Ab sage:

Ost

September 1984.
39.

Chri staph Bertram,

11

Berlin wagte zuviel, Bonn half zuwenig." Die Zeit, 14. September 1984.
40.

Gunter

Gaus,

11

Di e

Deutschlandpolitik

Stunde
mussen

der
der

Wahrhei t

Kanzler

und

kommt
seine

bestimmt.
Partei

In
bald

der
Farbe

44

bekennen, 11 Die Zeit, 20. July 1984; Klaus Bolling,
nicht

aus

Der

Kanzler

muss

endlich

11

sein

Tagespolitik reicht
Konzept

fur

die

Deutschlandpolitik deutlich machen, 11 Die Zeit, 27. July 1984; and Marion
Grafi n

Donhoff,

11

Wie

Vertrauen

verspiel t

wi rd

Polen

und

die

Leichtfertigkeit der Bonner Ostpolitik, Die Zeit, 21. September 1984.
41.

Zeit,

7.

Vormarsch
42.

11

Theo Sommer,

11

Alte Krampfe - Ostpolitische Schaumereien schaden nur, 11 Die

December
11

1984;

Gunter

Hofmann,

11

Die

Wunschdenker

auf

dem

Die Zeit, ll. January 1985.

Schlesier andern Motto fur Treffen," Frankfurter Rundschau, 23. January

1985;

Theo Sommer , 11

Grenzen,

Erdbeeren und Sauerki rschen.

Streit um das Schlesier treffen:

Hinter dem

Streit um die Ostpolitik, 11 Die Zeit, 8.

February 1985.
43.

11

Peter Bender,
desto

Deutsche und polnische Hupkas.

starker gebarden

Je schwacher Warschau ist,

sich die Konservativen in Bonn, 11 Die Zeit, 14.

December 1984.
44.

Quoted by Gunter Hofmann,

11

Der sperri ge Gedenktag.

oder Geschichte bewaltigen,

Geschichte verdrangen

das ist die Frage,i' Die Zeit, 25. January

1985.
45.

Kurt Becker,

11

Dunne Decke - Gemeinsamkeit ohne feste Grundlage," Die Zeit,

28. September 1984.
46.

Gunter Gaus,
Funktionar

11

Der Mann, der nicht von druben kam.

zum Staatsmann, 11

Die Zeit,

21.

Erich Honecker:

September

1984;

and

Varn

Dieter

Buhl , 11 Johannes Rau in der DOR - So manches Glas auf den Frieden, 11 Die
Zeit, 25. January 1985.
47.

11

Einpacken und woanders aufbauen -- Wie die DDR im Westen nach neuen

Partnern sucht, 11 Der Spiegel, Nr. 9, 4. March 1985, pp. 34-43.
48.

11

Einpacken ••• , 11 ibid., p. 40.

45

49.

Ibid., p. 43.

50.

11

51.

Bruns, op. cit., p. 15.

52.

Elizabeth Pond, "Remark sparks row over German unity/ Christian Science

Regierungserklarung 11 , op. cit., p. ll5.

Monitor, 22. May 1985.
53.

Bruns, op. cit., p. 108; Gaus, Wo Deutschland liegt, op. cit.

54.

Karl- Heinz Janssen, 11 Deutschland wohin? 11 Die Zeit, 12. April 1985.

55.

Theo Sommer, 11 1984 wird unser bestes Jahr, 11 Die Zeit, 3. August 1984.

56.

Werner Weidenfeld,

11

Ratloses Nationalgefuhl?

Fragen an die Deutsche

Frage ," Deutschl and Arc hi v, 6. June 1984, pp. 587-90.
57.

Gebhard Schweigler, National Consciousness in a Divided Germany {Beverly
Hills:

Sage,

1975);

also

West German Foreign Policy - The Domestic

Setting, The Washington Papers 106 {New York:

Prager, 1984).

